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Jurisdiction-Long-Arm StatueDoing Business-Commission of Torf*
Since the 1943 Supreme Court decision in InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington' a quiet revolution has been occurring in the law of
state in personam jurisdiction over non-residents. Prior to the decision in InternationalShoe the leading jurisdictional case had been
Pennoyer v. Neff. 2 Traditionally, in diversity of citizenship cases,
jurisdiction had favored the defendant by generally allowing suit at
the domicile of the defendant but not at the domicile of the plaintiff.
The rationale supporting this traditional favoritism of the defendant had been that, since the plaintiff controls the institution of the
suit, he might behave oppressively toward the defendant unless
restricted." But during the hundred years which followed Pennoyer,
activities of both businesses and individuals became increasingly
interstate in character. This new pattern of interstate activity was
superimposed on an existing legal pattern which was essentially
intrastate. It became apparent that in cases in which the controversy
arose out of conduct that was essentially multistate on the part of
the defendant and essentially local on the part of the plaintiff an
argument arose for reversing the traditional jurisdictional preference afforded defendants.' By 1927 jurisdiction over out-of-state
motorists was confirmed in Hess v. Pawlowski."
However, general jurisdiction was still based principally on three
types of relationships: the defendant's domicile, the defendant's
presence, or the defendant's consent." With InternationalShoe came a
new "minimum contacts" test. The Supreme Court held that a nonresident defendant could be subjected to the in personam jurisdiction
of the forum if certain "minimum contacts" within the forum could
be shown so that the suit did not "offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
* Blount v. T.D. Publishing Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966).
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For a critical analysis of the problems raised by this case see

Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 The Supreme Court Review 241.

3. von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1127 (1966).
4. Id. at 1167.
5. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
6. De'velopments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 91617 (1960).
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InternationalShoe was followed by McGee v. InternationalLife
Ins. Co. 7 and Hanson v. Denckla. In McGee, on the basis of a single
jurisdictional act, a mail order insurance business was held subject to
jurisdiction in the state of residency of the policy beneficiary.
In Hanson, a jurisdiction case involving a trust and trustee in one
forum and the corpus of the trust in another, the Court refused to
extend jurisdiction to the non-resident trustee, and indicated Pennoyer was still alive, stating ". .

it is a mistake to assume that this

trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts." 9
What does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under International Shoe seems to be a "reasonable"
assertion of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court has yet to give a
definitive analysis of what is reasonable under the minimum contacts
test. Any attempted reconciliation of the Supreme Court cases is
beyond the scope of this Comment,' ° but an assessment of the factors involved in considering the assertion of jurisdiction can be made
in conjunction with a discussion of New Mexico's long-arm statute,
and the recent case of Blount v. T.D. Publshing Corp."
After the decision in InternationalShoe the states recognized the
importance of the liberal minimum contacts test. The Illinois longarm statute was specifically drafted to take advantage of International Shoe'2 and it served as a model for subsequent enactments of
long-arm statutes by other states, 3 including New Mexico. 1 4 In
adopting the language of the Illinois statute it has been presumed
that New Mexico also adopted the prior construction of the statute
by the Illinois courts 5 and even though New Mexcio now has its own
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

8. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). For a criticism of this case see Hazard, supra, note 2.
9. Id. at 251.
10. For suggested resolutions see ExtraterritorialIn Personam Jurisdiction; The
Substantive Due Process Requirement, 13 Kan. L. Rev. 554, 561-62 (1964-65) and "Doing Business": Jurisdiction, Qualification and Taxation Applications, 11 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 259, 266-69 (1963).
11. 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966).
12. Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110 § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956), Historical and Practice Notes.
These Notes contain a complete history of the act.
13. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-1-26, 37-1-27 (Supp. 1965); Idaho Code
Ann. § 5-514 (Supp. 1963); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-308 (1964); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. § 93-2702 (Supp. 1963) ; N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 302 (Supp. 1967); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-235 (Supp. 1967) ; and Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.185 (1962).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1967) ; Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368
P.2d 582 (1962) ; Blount, supra.
15. Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962). Smith v. Meadows, 56
N.M. 242, 242 P.2d 1006 (1952).
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line of cases' it is still influenced by subsequent decisions of the
7
Illinois courts construing their statute.1
The rationale behind a long-arm statute is to provide in personam
jurisdiction over non-residents whose activities affect state residents,
and the New Mexcio statute provides wide grounds for the exercise
of such jurisdiction,"' as long as the cause of action arises from the
contacts with the forum enumerated in the statute. The New Mexico
case of Blount v. T.D. Publishing Corp.19 considers the sections
which provide jurisdiction over any person as to any cause of action
arising from the transaction of any business within this state, or
from the commission of a tortious act within this state. The New
Mexico Supreme Court has previously construed the statute, 20 but
Blount is important for two reasons. In Blount the court has extended the transacting business portion of the statute to its widest
possible application. But the court has also peripherally raised an
interpretation problem relating to the tortious act section which
could seriously curtail the effective use of the statute.
Blount involved an action for invasion of privacy. The defendant
T. D. Publishing Corp. published a magazine containing the article
in question in Pennsylvania and sold it in New York to the defendant
MacFadden-Bartell, the primary distributor. Independent wholesale distributors throughout the nation, including the defendant
Beck News Agency in New Mexico, purchased the magazine from
MacFadden-Bartell. Neither T. D. Publishing Corp. nor MacFadden-Bartell had any control over the independant wholesale distributors, nor did they have offices, employees or agents in New Mexico.
On these facts T.D. Publishing Corp. and McFadden-Bartell
16. Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. v. Petroleum Club Inn Co. 77 N.M. 92, 419 P.2d 465
(1966) ; Yarbro v. Koury, 72 N.M. 295, 383 P.2d 258 (1963) ; Crawford v. Refiners Cooperative Assoc. Inc., 71 N.M. 1, 375 P.2d 212 (1962) ; Gray v. Armijo, 70 N.M. 245,
372 P.2d 821 (1962) ; and Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962).
17. Blount, supra.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. 21-3-16 (Supp. 1967) provides:
A. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person, or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection
thereby submits himself or his personal representative to the jurisdiction of
this state as to any cause of action arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
(2) The operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state;
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state; or
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting.
19. 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966).
20. See note 18, supra.
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moved to quash service because the New Mexico courts lacked
jurisdiction. Plaintiff argued that the New Mexico courts had jurisdiction under both the transacting business and the tortious act provisions of the long-arm statute. The trial court ruled for the defendants. On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed.
The Supreme Court said that the scheme of distribution established
by the defendants was included within the transacting business provision of the long-arm statute but refused to consider application of
the tortious act provision of the statute. The court held the jurisdictional act was the distribution of a defective article-the magazine
containing the story which allegedly violated the right of privacy of
a New Mexico resident-which the defendants chose to place in
nationwide channels of distribution. With such a distribution plan,
entry of the magazine into New Mexico was foreseeable. The court
stated:
the regular distribution plan of the defendants with the commercial
benefit to the non-resident defendants which they derive from the sale
of magazines is sufficient contact to satisfy the requirements of due

process2 1and subject the defendants . . . to the jurisdiction of our
courts.

Two issues are raised in Blount: first, the court's broad interpreta-

tion of what constitutes transacting business within the state; and
second, the court's refusal to consider the commission of a tortious
act provision of the long-arm statute as a basis for jurisdiction.
The finding, on the facts presented in Blount, that the defendants
were transacting business within the state expands jurisdiction close
to the limits of due process. However, it is not an unreasonable decision in view of recent cases, nor is it opposed to modern judicial22
trends. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,

in the comments to its transacting business provision, states that its
provisions, based on the Illinois statute, should be given the same
expansive interpretation intended by the draftsmen of the Illinois
statute and given to that statute by the Illinois courts.

23

New Mex-

ico, in interpreting its own statute, has
generally followed the liberal
24
interpretations of the Illinois courts.

In concluding that the defendants were transacting business within
21.
22.
23.
24.

Blount, supra at 391, 423 P.2d at 426.
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.03, 9B, U.L.A.
Id., Commissioner's Note at 310-11.
Blount, supra.
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the state, the New Mexico court relied heavily on Gray v. American
Radiator& StandardSanitary Corp.,2 a leading Illinois case in the
area of jurisdiction, and also cited Andersen v. National Presto
Industries, Inc. 26 and Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg.
Corp.27 All three of these cases are decisions, not under transacting
business provisions, but under tortious act provisions of various
long-arm statutes. In Gray the non-resident defendant constructed a
safety valve which it sold to another non-resident who incorporated
it into a water heater. The heater was later sold in Illinois and
exploded, injuring the Illinois plaintiff. The defendant had no employees or agents in Illinois. The Illinois court held the defendant
committed a tortious act in Illinois, and had sufficient minimum contacts to be subjected to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts. The court
in Gray talked about ascertaining what is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances, the relevant inquiry being whether the defendant
engaged in some act or conduct by which he may be said to have
invoked the benefits and protection of the law of the forum. The
decision placed emphasis on corporate business activities within the
state to support its holding that a single tortious act, the negligence
occurring outside the forum and the injury occurring inside the
forum, was sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Since the court in Gray
was concerned with the defendant's contacts with the forum, as
were the courts in Ehlers and Anderson, the New Mexico court
logically expanded the reasoning in Gray to cover activities in the
forum amounting to a transaction of business. This expansion of the
Gray rationale parallels a similar expansion in the Illinois courts.
In Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts,28 an action against a New
York broker under the transacting business section of the Illinois
long-arm statute, the court stated it followed Gray in holding that
jurisdiction over a non-resident does not depend on the defendant or
its agent having participated in substantial transaction of business
while physically present in Illinois. In Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin
Co.2" the Illinois court held that only the "minimum contacts" test
must be satisfied in order to find transaction of business. They concluded that, even though Gray was a tort case, the same standards
should be applied and the contact between the plaintiff and the out25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961).
257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965).
267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963).
73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1966).
80 Ill. App. 2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (1967).
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of-state defendant, under the expanded concept of due process of
Gray, satisfied the "minimum contacts" prerequisite for in personam
jurisdiction. A recent Ninth Circuit case, Bibie v. T.D. Publishing
Corp., ° involved a publisher and a third party distributor under
essentially the same facts as presented in Blount. The court reached
the same conclusion as the New Mexico court did in Blount, holding
that T.D. Publishing Corp. was doing business within the state under
the jurisdictional statute. The court considered the assertion of
jurisdiction reasonable in view of the interests of the state in providing redress for wrongs done to its citizens, the availability of the
evidence, the injury occurring in the state, and the relative convenience of the forum.
For future assessment of cases no exact rule as to what constitutes
"transacting any business within this state" can be formulated. In
Blount the court said, "what is sufficient minimal contact must be decided case by case."'" Considering the multitude of possible fact situations to which the statute might be applied, it is reasonable not to
unduly restrict the statute with any dicta which might narrow later
interpretations. However, from an examination of the Illinois cases,
the federal cases and the New Mexico cases, a rough appraisal can
be gained of what is reasonable under a minimum contacts test.
Any determination of reasonableness is a balancing of interests,
and in such a balancing the following factors may apply:
A. Interest of the forum state.
1. Providing a forum for its residents.
2. Regulation of the conduct involved.
3. Deterrence of tortious conduct in the forum.
4. Providing and ensuring compensation for its injured plaintiffs.
30. 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
31. Blount, supra at 391, 423 P.2d at 426. Some courts attempt to give publishers
added protection against being subjected to libel suits in foreign jurisdictions, usually
on the rationale that a multitude of suits in foreign forums would tend to inhibit freedom of the press. Cases are split over this added protection, but two leading cases representing this view are New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966),
and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132 (10th Cir. 1962). The added protection cases and rationale are fully discussed in Constitutional Limitations to LongArm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 436 (1967) and LongArm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 342
(1967). While New Mexico did not follow the added protection cases in Blount, since
Blount deals with a publisher rather than a manufacturer of safety valves as did Gray,
the added protection cases serve to make the holding in Blount more controversial than
it otherwise might be.
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B. Evaluation of the contacts of the defendant with the forum.
1. Whether the cause of action arose out of the contacts.
2. The quality and quantity of the contacts.
3. Assertion by the defendant, at the time of the contacts, of
his ability to function within the forum. (e.g., a life insurance company's assertion of its ability to pay claims in the
forum.)
C. Impact in the forum caused by acts or omissions outside the
forum.
1. Foreseeability of the impact.
2. Extent of the possible impact (e.g., a small retail merchant
who sold one defective tire to a person from the forum, or
a manufacturer who shipped large quantities of defective
tires into the forum.)
D. Relative availability of evidence and witnesses.
E. Relative convenience to the parties, including such elements as
whether the parties are individuals or large corporations, and
availability of alternate forums.
F. Avoidance
of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudica2
tions.3
These factors will necessarily vary in number and importance
from case to case. Even by analyzing these factors as they may be
present in a particular case, no definitive line can always be easily
drawn. But despite this imprecision, by an analysis which includes
these factors some determination of reasonableness can be made.
In Blount the injury arose from the contact with New Mexico.
New Mexico has some interest in deterring invasions of privacy of
its citizens, and also in providing compensation for its injured citizens. The evidence and witnesses would be concentrated in New
Mexico. The injury was foreseeable since the publication was knowingly placed in the stream of interstate commerce. The plaintiff was
an individual and the non-resident defendants were corporations
who regularly transacted business on an interstate level. In defamation cases it has been recognized that the state where the plaintiff resides is usually the state where substantial impact occurs. It is here
that consequential injuries such as economic loss, interruption of so32. See 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, supra at note 6; and 13 Kan. L. Rev. 554 and 11
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 259, supra at note 10. For examples of cases using this type of analysis
see Bibie v. T.D. Publishing Corp., 252 F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1966) and Hearne v. DowBadische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
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cial relationships and mental distress are concentrated. 3 This same
reasoning applies equally to invasion of privacy cases. None of these
factors, by itself, may be sufficient to support jurisdiction, but taken
in total, they will support the assertion of jurisdiction.
The extension of the transacting business section of the long-arm
statute in Blount is controversial and some other courts faced with
similar fact situations have found no jurisdiction.34 But the transaction of business test is not the older and more rigid "doing business"
test. The long-arm statutes are designed to give the states wide
grounds for jurisdiction and should be so interpreted. In view of the
increasingly interstate character of modern commerce it is felt the
decision in Blount as to what constitutes transaction of business is
reasonable and will become increasingly beneficial to New Mexico
residents.
However, the holding on transaction of business may be offset by
the disturbing statement of the court on the tortious act section of
the statute. New Mexico has yet to take full advantage of this section and the discussion in Blount may have opened the door to placement of severe limitations on the tortious act provision. The court,
in passing on the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants had committed a tortious act within the terms of the statute, said, "the answer to the question raised by this contention depends upon whether
the article is privileged which we have determined is a question for
the trier of the facts.""5 This statement indicates, assuming a fact
situation where jurisdiction could be based solely on the commission
of a tortious act, that such jurisdiction would depend on the outcome
of a trial on the merits. This could present the absurd picture of requiring a trial on the merits for jurisdiction, or the possibility of two
trials; one as to jurisdiction and one as to liability. The serious problem is that this interpretation of the statute could compel the plaintiff to litigate the merits in a distant forum, something the statute
was intended to prevent. If the defendant, in a case where jurisdicion was based on the commission of a tortious act, took a default
judgment in New Mexico he could resist enforcement in his home
forum and, under the guise of a trial as to jurisdictional facts, the
33. Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875 (1956).
34. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.
1959) ; Sonnier v. Time, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. La. 1959) and Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
35. Blount, supra at 391, 423 P.2d at 426.
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defendant could compel the plaintiff to litigate the merits in the defendant's forum. 6 Since the New Mexico courts have not decided a
case directly in point, the statement in Blount could be a compelling
argument for other states to adopt this construction of the New
Mexico statute.
Illinois long ago solved the problem of interpreting the commission of a tortious act provision and of deciding whether the court
would be precluded from taking jurisdiction until the plaintiff had
established that the defendant's act was a tort. In Nelson v. Miller87
the Illinois court construed the commission of a tortious act to mean
commission of an act which was tortious if proved as alleged. There
needed to be no determination of the merits since ultimate liability in
tort was not a jurisdictional fact. The court stated:
the jurisdictional requirements . . . are met when the defendant
• . . is the author of acts or omissions within the State, and when the
complaint states a cause of action in tort. . . . An act or omission
within the State . . . is a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether or not the act or omission gives rise to lia38
bility in tort.
In view of the problems raised by the statement in Blount and the
solution of such problems by the Illinois courts, it is felt that the
New Mexico court, at the earliest opportunity, should clarify its position on the tortious act provision of the long-arm statute.
A different problem may arise where there is an in-state injury
caused by an out-of-state act or omission of a non-resident. Early
federal cases interpreting the Illinois statute held the statute did not
cover this fact situation.3 9 However, the Illinois courts have subsequently held the place of the wrong is the place where the injury occurred, and that the statute gives Illinois jurisdiction in such cases. 40
This holding follows the general rule that for determining the applicable state substantive law the place of the tort is the place of the
36. See 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 55.09 (1966) ; 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice
§ 60.25(2) (1966) ; and F. James, Civil Procedure §§ 11.5, 11.6 (1965).
37. 11 Ill.
2d 378, 143 N.E. 2d 673 (1957).
38. Id. at 393-94, 143 N.E.2d at 681.
39. See Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959) and
Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
40. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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injury and not the place of the act or omission. 4' There are, however, some cases interpreting similar statutes which hold otherwise.4 2
In jurisdictions following the Illinois interpretation, this holding has
not been expanded to the point where it works an unreasonable hardship on the non-resident defendant. In cases of this type most courts
look not only at the injury, but also at such elements as the contacts
of the non-resident defendant with the forum and the extent of forseeability of injury in the forum. 43 This concern for elements not directly applicable to the issue of tortious conduct is probably due to
the regard by courts for due process standards. This concern further
explains why the court in Blount can take the reasoning from a tortious act case and apply it to a transaction of business case.
Impinging on the question of where the act occurred is the New
Mexico Single Publication Act 44 which provides, in part, that no person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy founded upon a single publication, such as a magazine. This statute might be construed as requiring a finding that an
action for libel rises only once at the time of the first publication, and
there would be no cause of action in New Mexico if publication occurred first in another state. This is particularly true in view of In.
sull v. New York World-Telegram Corp.,45 a Seventh Circuit case
construing Illinois law. In Insull, under a fact situation similar to
41. See Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963) ;
Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Co., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963) ; and
Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc., v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66 Wash. 469, 403 P.2d 351
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025 (1965).
42. The leading case in this line of decisions is the New York case of Feathers v.
McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S.
905 (1965). The Court in Feathers held that injury caused in New York by a product
manufactured in another state did not constitute a tortious act within the meaning of
the jurisdictional statute. For a criticism of this decision see 66 Colum. L. Rev. 199
(1966) and 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 49 (1965). Feathers is still followed in some jurisdictions; for example see Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (Colo. 1966). However,
it is apparent that Feathers did not achieve a correct interpretation of legislative intent, for in 1966 the New York legislature amended N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 302(a) (3) to
overcome the interpretive problems of Feathers.
43. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Co., 267 Minn. 56, 124
N.W.2d 824 (1963); and Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 66
Wash. 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1025 (1965). See also Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) in which jurisdiction is
given to the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and
with the parties. The place of injury is only one, though an important, factor.
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. 40-27-30 (Repl. 1964).
45. 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
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Blount, the court reasoned there was no cause of action in Illinois
since in cases of multi-state circulation the cause of action is absolutely complete at the time of the first publication and subsequent
distribution is of no consequence in the creation of a cause of action.
Insull has been criticized by many, particularly after the Illinois decision in Gray,48 and the holding in Insull as to transacting business
was specifically rejected in Blount. Nevertheless, the tortious act
portion of Insull has been upheld by the Seventh Circuit court."
Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,48 a Second Circuit case, answers
these problems and appears to present the better view. The Second
Circuit court reasoned that the single publication rule is not designed
to deprive a plaintiff defamed in another state of his privilege to
bring suit under a long-arm statute, but is designed to protect the defendant, and the courts, from a multiplicity of suits. The court said
sending a libel into a state where the plaintiff lives is still "tortious
conduct" within the terms of long-arm statutes. This interpretation
would solve problems presented by the New Mexico Single Publication Act. But no matter whether the New Mexico Court decided that
the fact situation in Blount did or did not fall within the terms of
the tortious act provision, it should have so stated, rather than
avoiding the issue entirely and raising the possible interpretation
problems previously discussed.
Blount thus presents a Jekyll and Hyde aspect. The transaction of
business interpretation will serve the needs of New Mexico residents
who have claims against non-residents, but the tortious act interpretation unless clarified in the manner suggested above could serve to
deprive injured plaintiffs of remedies which the statute was designed
to give them.
WILLIAM C. WILLIAMS, JR.

46. See, e.g., Curie, The Gro'wth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L. F. 533.
47. Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1965).
48. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Restatement (Second) Conflicts, supra
note 43, § 379 (e) and comments following.

